


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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10 NOVEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 45)

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Propaganda analysis report
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10 NOVEMBER 1971

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 NOVEMBER 1971

Moscow (2754 items)

October Revolution	(1%)	30%
Anniversary		
[Grishin, Grechko	(--)	7%
Speeches		
Brezhnev in France	(34%)	9%
Brezhnev in GDR	(2%)	5%
Allende Election	(--)	2%
Anniversary		
Kosygin in Cuba	(7%)	2%
China	(3%)	2%
Indochina	(1%)	2%

Peking (1821 items)

Domestic Issues	(29%)	21%
UN Vote on China*	(23%)	20%
Asia-Africa Table	(6%)	17%
Tennis Matches		
in PRC		
Albania	(2%)	9%
Indochina	(6%)	8%
[DPRK Delegation	(4%)	2%]
in DRV		
Peru-PRC Diplomatic	(--)	5%
Relations		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* The entry "U.S. Vote on China" in the 3 November TRENDS should be corrected to read "UN Vote on China."

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CHINA

EVIDENCE INDICATES PURGE OF LIN, OTHER MILITARY CHIEFS

Most of the PRC's active top military leaders have been out of public view for two months, and there is mounting evidence of a major purge in the armed forces extending up to Lin Piao, the defense minister and "deputy supreme commander." Lin's name has not been mentioned in monitored PRC media for over a month. Though the apparent purge may have been precipitated by Lin's failing health, recent politically charged comment which may be interpreted as aimed at Lin suggests that Mao's heir-designate is politically moribund.

IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN Lin Piao appears to be the primary target of a recently launched ideological campaign condemning the "idealist conception of history" for emphasizing the role of "heroes" and "theorists of genius." The current drive has been most notably reflected in an article in RED FLAG No. 11, first broadcast by the Shanghai radio on 23 October, which added a significant new thrust to the continuing campaign to deepen the study of Mao's philosophical works in order to eradicate the influence of "sham Marxists" and "political swindlers." Directing the new thrust at those who "regard themselves as theorists of genius," the RED FLAG article seems to be developing a case against Lin based on his "excessive" praise of Mao, an error deriving from his major role in the cultural revolution as the most outstanding student and propagator of Mao's thought. "Excessive" adulation of Mao had previously figured in charges against Yang Cheng-wu, the PLA acting chief of staff purged in 1968, and Politburo member Chen Po-ta, the leading Maoist ideologue who has been missing since the party plenum last August and September.

The RED FLAG article denied the existence of innate knowledge and stressed that truth can be determined only by "objective results in social practice." Striking at the idea that "people can cultivate themselves into supermen with foresight and vision," the article pointedly cited a line from the "Internationale"--"never there is a savior, nor will we rely on gods or emperors"--to buttress its argument that "there is no man with congenital foresight and vision." In the past few weeks a campaign has been unfolding to promote the "Internationale" and another song, the military-orientated "The Three Main Rules of Discipline and

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the Eight Points for Attention." A joint article by PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, released by NCNA on 27 October, urged that the masses "be repeatedly taught to sing the songs in close connection with the current situation and tasks."

Lin's vulnerable position on the question of innate wisdom and genius, a quality he attributed to Mao, was expressed in a speech he gave at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee Politburo in May 1966. In that speech, according to Red Guard publications, Lin claimed that Mao had "inherited, defended, and developed Marxism-Leninism with genius." Praising Mao for "his great proletarian natural talent" and declaring that "we should recognize natural talent," Lin reportedly declared that "Chairman Mao is a natural leader" whose Thought "will remain brilliant forever" and obsequiously claimed that what Mao "says in one sentence is better than what we say in 10,000 sentences."

One of the first indications in the media of the nature of the attack on Lin came in a Ningsia broadcast on 5 November which recalled that since the death of Marx and Engels, "opportunist of various kinds have launched rabid attacks against Marxism." Specifically, the broadcast noted that Mikhail Bakunin, the 19th Century Russian anarchist and writer, once wrote to Marx saying, "'I am your student, and I am proud of this'" and later led a "conspiracy to usurp the leadership of the First International." In tracing the antecedents of unnamed elements in the CCP who have "inherited the style of the ancestors of revisionism," the broadcast mentioned that Khrushchev, who "slandered" Stalin after his death, had previously praised him as "greatest genius, teacher, and leader of mankind, a great invincible supreme commander"--terms Lin has used with reference to Mao. While Chen Po-ta also fits the image of a fawning political swindler plotting crimes after Mao's death, references in the broadcast to seizing military power make Lin the more likely target. The broadcast stated that the faction "in power within the party" taking the capitalist road "will always try to seize power over the army," and it observed that in CCP history Chang Kuo-tao had previously tried to "split the red army and establish a separate party central committee."

Lin's apparent removal from active control of the PLA was suggested in the Ningsia broadcast's reference to the PLA as "a powerful proletarian army personally founded and led by Chairman Mao," with no mention of Lin's leadership role in the army. A diminution of Lin's status as the leader in control of the PLA had first been reflected in another variation of this formula, appearing in the joint Peking press

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editorial marking Army Day on 1 August. At a time of apparent moves to depersonalize control of the army, the joint editorial referred to the PLA as a force "founded and led" by Mao and "commanded" by Lin--a step back from the usual formula since 1967, which had described the army as "personally founded and led" by Mao and "directly commanded" by Lin.

An attempt is also being made to bolster the image of Mao himself as an active military leader. An unusual Lanchow broadcast on 28 October, for example, recalled Mao's leadership role "on the old battlefields in northern Shensi" where he "personally commanded the battles." The broadcast noted that during the Yenan period Mao "not only took command of the liberation work throughout the country, but also directly commanded the fighting in the northwest war theater winning a great victory there."

While the applicability of many recent attacks to more than one missing leader makes it difficult to identify the players without the scorecards which may be available to Chinese cadres, a 20 October PEOPLE'S DAILY article broadcast by Radio Peking also seemed pointed particularly against Lin. The broadcast quoted Lu Hsun, literary figure of the 1920's and 1930's, as having said that what had hurt him most "was the sinister arrow fired by my ally and his smiling face after I was wounded." In an apparent allusion to betrayal by close comrades, the article said that in order to "prevent himself from being attacked from behind," Lu was forced "to sidestep and was unable to launch a frontal attack on his enemies"--a course which seems akin to Mao's zigzags. Lu was also said to have constantly reminded the masses to pay attention not only to the obvious enemy but also to "secret agents in one's own camp." Perhaps to imply that there was military support for "sham Marxists," the article stated that "if the struggle against sham Marxism is tantamount to a civil war among warlords, then it is more important than ever for leftwing theorists to fight a civil war . . . and withdraw the poisonous arrows fired from behind."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AS AN ISSUE

Characteristically, Peking media have
carefully avoided suggesting discord
over issues that could have produced
a major purge of the military leadership. There were, how-
ever, a few possible allusions to dissension over resource

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allocation priorities in the media during the summer,* and such differences may have been exacerbated by the major new development in Chinese foreign affairs in the recent period, the invitation to President Nixon. Movement toward Sino-U.S. detente could have served the arguments of elements who played down a need for weapons expenditures to defend the country against external threats. There is evidence at least that the developments in Sino-U.S. relations are involved in the current maneuvering: A 5 November article broadcast by the Kiangsu radio stated that

the class struggle in international circles and the class struggle at home are linking with each other. Any slight happening in international circles can incite the desire of a handful of class enemies at home to evil.

The article went on to note that ideological changes hinge on changes on the international as well as the domestic scene and to observe that "the more drastically and rapidly the situation develops and changes, the stronger will be the reactions of various classes and strata to the situation."

There had been a few earlier indications that Mao's "revolutionary diplomatic line" was not immediately accepted by all elements in the leadership. Most notably, there were efforts in the media to explain the benefits of the new line to local units, especially military units. Typically, a Sinkiang broadcast on 24 October described how a PLA unit had strengthened its understanding of the new line: "Previously" some members of the unit's party committee had lacked understanding of the "sharp and complicated international class struggle," but after reading from Marx and Mao they realized that while the reactionary class will struggle ever more frantically, it is doomed so long as the revolutionary army stays alert and follows Mao.

PARTY CONTROL Since the 1 August celebration of Army Day, the first public occasion at which Lin's status was noticeably diminished, signs of army-party discord have been manifest in increasingly frequent articles on the need for PLA units to follow the orders of party committees.

* See the 1 September TRENDS, pages 39-41.

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A complementary theme has been that militia units must be firmly under party control, with emphasis on the need for county and lower-level armed forces departments, which handle militia affairs, to obey the "unified leadership" of the local party committees. PLA dominance has also been qualified by the campaign to promote collective leadership, a campaign which has included frequent reminders that the military figures who occupy most party posts on local levels are not infallible and that the exemplary ones do not act without prior approval by the full CCP committee. A 21 October Tsinan broadcast encompassed all these points in describing how the PLA head of a commune armed forces department, who was also deputy secretary of the commune party committee, had reformed his thought: He had been making decisions affecting the militia without consultations, and as a result "militia work was not carried out smoothly"; after study, he came to regard "the people's armed forces department as a branch of the party committee," subject to all committee orders.

A Hopei broadcast article on 31 October stated that since the end of the second plenary session of the Central Committee in the fall of 1970, and in particular since the beginning of the year "in the light of the new trends of the current class struggles at home and abroad, as well as the reality of the thinking of the troops and militia," the party committee of the military district had led the troops in mass study so that they could distinguish between "genuine and sham Marxism." As part of their study, the PLA cadres were said to have examined the party's historical record for instances in which leaders from Chen Tu-hsiu to Liu Shao-chi had tried "splitting the party and the army."

A Chengtu radio report on 30 October called for the PLA to "march in step from top to bottom" and "obey the orders of Chairman Mao, the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, and Mao Tse-tung Thought in everything." Struggle must be carried out "against all flaws hindering marching in step" so that the army's "glorious tradition of obeying orders in everything" can be carried forward. The broadcast warned against "everyone going his own way and taking arbitrary action." Reflecting the intensity of current disciplinary problems within the PLA, the broadcast cautioned that "we must oppose doing one thing to people's faces but doing something else behind their backs, and pursuing murky things."

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ASCENDANCY OF
YEH CHIEN-YING

The only clear gainer so far in the leadership crisis is Yeh Chien-ying, one of the 10 "old marshals" and a military leader known to have close past associations with Chou En-lai. Yeh was a staff general during most of the civil-war and held important posts under Lin in the central-south region during the post-1949 period. Although he was the target of some public criticism during the cultural revolution, he did not appear to be in serious trouble; at the same time, he did not appear to be exercising very much power. During the past two months, however, he has made numerous publicized appearances as senior military officer present; and beginning with the celebrations of the Albanian party's 30th anniversary on 8 November, he has moved up in the leadership rankings ahead of civilian leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan into the missing Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng's old position behind Chiang Ching.

While some other leaders have also been notably more active than before in the recent period, they have for the most part been appearing as stand-ins for Huang Yung-sheng and the other missing PLA service chiefs.

One missing provincial leader has resurfaced in Peking: Hua Kuo-feng, Hunan first secretary, unmentioned at some recent provincial functions he would have been expected to attend, was reported among those seeing off the PRC's UN delegation on 9 November and was grouped with leading members of the central party and government apparatus.

ALL PROVINCIAL STATIONS NOW ORIGINATING POLITICAL MATERIAL

On 5 November the Kweichow provincial radio resumed locally originated programming after a month-long solid relay of Radio Peking. Kweichow, with a long history of factional problems, had previously ended a 20-month solid relay of Peking Radio on 18 May, the same day its new provincial CCP committee was announced; it reverted to relaying Peking broadcasts on 8 October. With Kweichow's resumption of original programming, all 29 provincial-level radio stations are now originating political material for the first time since January 1967.

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In another broadcasting development, the new winter-spring schedule for the Peking radio's domestic service, announced 8 November, provides further evidence of a muting of the "cult of Mao." Effective 15 November, two morning quarter-hour programs entitled "Selected Readings from Chairman Mao's Works" will be discontinued. Five-minute programs of news briefs will be added "during the mid-morning and late evening hours."

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OCTOBER REVOLUTION ADDRESS

GRISHIN OPTIMISTIC IN REVIEW OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

In the 6 November keynote address on the eve of the 54th anniversary celebration of the October Revolution, Politburo member Grishin exuded confidence on the state of the world, pointing to a "considerable weakening" of imperialism in the face of an "effective rebuff" from peace-loving forces headed by the international communist movement. Among other problem areas, he cited the "financial crisis" in the United States which has "aggravated the contradictions among the imperialists." Reaffirming Soviet adherence to the "Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence and support for the liberation forces," Grishin emphasized the latter point in noting the CPSU's support for "the trend toward consolidation of all revolutionary movements" and asserted the party's conviction that cooperation between the revolutionary and democratic parties and communists is "the guarantee of the final victory of the national liberation revolutions, the guarantee of independent and progressive development of the liberated states."

Grishin characterized the Soviet "peace program"--outlined by Brezhnev in the 30 March Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress--as "a realistic and constructive approach to international problems ripe for resolution by methods of negotiations and cooperation." At the same time, describing the spirit of the program as "militantly anti-imperialist," he sought to underscore the point that the peace offensive implies no breach in continuity or erosion of ideological principle. In what may have been intended as an invidious comparison with the Chinese, he declared that Soviet actions in the international arena are founded not on "transitory considerations of a speculative" nature, but on "a principled, strategic course based on a scientific analysis of the laws of world development." At a later point, he asserted that in the interests of world peace and as a counter to the "dangerous military adventures" of world imperialism, the CPSU is raising the defensive might of the USSR, a theme repeated by Defense Minister Grechko in his Red Square address on the 7th.

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In his rundown of outstanding foreign policy issues, Grishin perfunctorily criticized the United States for its actions in Indochina and for its support of Israel in the Middle East and complained of the "splitting, anti-Soviet line" pursued by the Chinese leadership.* He touched only briefly on disarmament issues, noting that "positive results" have been achieved at the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation and observing that "the world progressive public has welcomed with satisfaction" the Soviet proposals for convening a conference of the five nuclear powers and a world disarmament conference, as well as the Soviet proposals for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, for banning bacteriological weapons, for ending underground nuclear tests, "and others." Suslov's keynote address last year had not mentioned disarmament.

Grishin reviewed the recent flurry of trips abroad by the Soviet leadership, remarking that exchanges, visits, consultations, and talks between national political figures serve the interests of strengthening peace and cooperation. He did not, however, treat the question of U.S.-Soviet relations or mention President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the USSR. He dealt at some length with Brezhnev's October visit to France, which had been heavily played up in Soviet media, observing that it has served to ease international tension and to strengthen world peace and European security. He said the improvement in Soviet-West German relations similarly improves the prospects for world peace and security in Europe.

Grishin lauded the four-power agreement on Berlin of 3 September but did not mention the FRG's 1970 treaties with the USSR and Poland, which remain unratified. Repeating the call for a European security conference, he noted that conditions have now been created for its convening "as early as 1972." The 30 October Soviet-French declaration following Brezhnev's visit to France had registered both sides' hope that preparations will be made to enable a conference to meet in 1972.

* Grishin's remarks on Indochina are discussed at greater length in the Indochina section of this TRENDS. See the Sino-Soviet Relations section for a discussion of Moscow's current stance toward the PRC.

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On the Middle East, Grishin routinely pledged Soviet support for the Arabs in their struggle against "Israeli aggression backed by American imperialism." While recalling that this position was again confirmed during Egyptian President as-Sadat's talks in Moscow last month, Grishin did not take the occasion to repeat the pledge in the Soviet-Egyptian communique on measures to strengthen Cairo's "military might." But routine comment has reiterated Podgornyy's statement, at a dinner for as-Sadat, that the USSR will combine efforts to achieve a political settlement with measures to help the ARE and other friendly Arab countries in strengthening their "defense capability." Grishin did charge Israel with thwarting a political settlement, claiming that the "predatory" Israeli plans fail to take into account the Arabs' "firm will" to defend their interests as well as the increasingly strong friendship and cooperation between the Arab and Soviet peoples.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW WARNS OF MOTIVES BEHIND CHINESE DIPLOMATIC MOVES

Moscow has renewed its attack on the Chinese leadership after a lull of almost a month in anti-China polemics, roughly spanning the period since the 12 October announcement of the Soviet invitation to President Nixon. In the October Revolution anniversary address on 6 November Grishin made the standard call for normalization of Sino-Soviet state relations, but in contrast to Suslov last year he coupled this call with the charge that the Chinese leaders are engaging in anti-Sovietism--the allegation that prompted the walkout of two Chinese diplomats and several journalists.* On the eve of the anniversary TASS publicized a lengthy, vitriolic article in INTERNATIONAL LIFE accusing the Chinese leadership of trying to form an anti-Soviet bloc and of reaching new heights in "fanatical" efforts to split the communist movement.

The attack on Peking led off Grishin's remarks on relations with the socialist countries. While reaffirming Moscow's desire for normalized relations and claiming that Soviet initiative in this regard has borne "some fruit," Grishin observed that "serious progress" requires a desire for cooperation from both sides and that "unfortunately the Chinese leadership is continuing its splitting, anti-Soviet line." Consistent with Soviet practice in recent months, he did not mention the Sino-Soviet border talks, which Suslov last year had said "could not be described as easy." Under-scoring the unaltered CPSU position toward the PRC as defined at the 24th congress, Grishin reaffirmed as its basis "a principled struggle against the ideological and political platform of the CCP leadership--which is incompatible with Leninism." He added that the struggle includes "resolute exposure of Peking's hostile propaganda and defense of the Soviet Union's national interests."

APALIN ARTICLE Entitled "The Antisocialist Essence of Peking's Foreign Policy," the lengthy article by Apalin in the November issue of the monthly INTERNATIONAL LIFE--signed to the press on 21 October and

* Neither Chinese nor Soviet media acknowledged the walkout.

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publicized by TASS on 4 November--represents the latest Soviet propaganda broadside designed to discredit the Chinese leadership and to dissuade communist and other countries from receptivity to Peking's flexible diplomatic moves. Apalin's message to those who would consort with Peking is that although its methods and tactics have changed, "sometimes fundamentally," PRC foreign policy "in essence remains the same--antisocialist, insidious, and dangerous to the revolutionary movement." In this context Apalin revives the recurrent theme--present, for example, in the 25 July I. Aleksandrov article in PRAVDA--that Peking "would like to provoke a military conflict between socialism and capitalism and then become the hegemonic force in a world destroyed by war." He also cites Peking's rejection of the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers as further evidence of the PRG's "adventurist course aimed at intensifying international tensions."

Although Peking is trying to disguise the real import of its current diplomatic maneuvers, Apalin declares, the PRC's chief foreign policy goal is "to form a bloc aimed primarily against the Soviet Union and world socialism." This bloc, he adds, would be composed of "individual socialist countries, developing countries, and even some imperialist states." Concern on this score had been expressed in less pointed terms at the leadership level and in authoritative Soviet press comment in the wake of the announcement of President Nixon's projected visit to Peking. Gromyko had raised the specter of "combinations" of states directed against other states in the course of an explicit discussion of Sino-U.S. relations in his 28 September UN General Assembly speech. And Brezhnev, at a dinner for President Pompidou in Paris on 27 October, made a thinly veiled allusion to possible Sino-U.S. collusion on Indochina when he warned that the problem cannot be solved "either by attempts to impose an alien will on Vietnam by means of force or by way of secret combinations behind the backs of the Vietnamese people."

In Moscow's first authoritative press reaction to President Nixon's Peking trip, the 25 July I. Aleksandrov article had cautioned against the formation of "political combinations aimed against other states." More pointedly, an article by D. Volskiy in NEW TIMES No. 35 in September interpreted a RED FLAG article disseminated widely by Peking in August as an attempt to justify the invitation to President Nixon on the grounds of the need for maximum flexibility in order to

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differentiate the "main enemy" from the "secondary enemy." Recalling that the Japanese had been specified as the main enemy during World War II, Volskiy clearly implied--but stopped short of saying in so many words--that Peking regards the Soviet Union as the main enemy today: After maintaining that the President's planned visit to Peking was behind the publication of the RED FLAG article, he concluded that it was "obvious" why Peking was advocating alliances with "the intermediate forces" and a temporary, tactical truce with "the secondary enemies" in order to concentrate its efforts against "the main enemy."

Apalin in INTERNATIONAL LIFE now charges that in order to facilitate their anti-Soviet goals the Chinese leaders are willing to abandon their previously proclaimed principles and to "neglect the common tasks of the anti-imperialist struggle and perform sharp volte-faces in policy when they see a possibility of reaching some agreement with the imperialists which benefits solely China's national interests." Stating that the anti-Soviet orientation of China's foreign policy "invariably meets with understanding" in the capitalist world, Apalin adds the allegation that "the diplomatic recognition of the PRC by Western countries is a form of payment for the policy of splitting and undermining the united front of the anti-imperialist forces--a payment for anti-Sovietism."

Turning specifically to Peking's divisive efforts in the world communist movement, Apalin says that "the Chinese leaders are now more fanatical than any time in the past in trying by every means to raise obstacles to the development of socialist unity." He alludes to Romania's and Yugoslavia's cordial relations with Peking in observing that the Chinese are pursuing a "differentiated" approach to the socialist countries and are playing on "nationalism" and anti-Sovietism to encourage "neutralism" among Moscow's allies. Noting that Peking is using a variety of means to achieve its ends--ranging from "the restoration of party links with countries which until recently were among the 'revisionist parties'" to the advancement of "material incentives"--he caps his lecture with the statement: "Marxist-Leninist parties believe that it is impossible to reconcile the Peking leaders' splitist policy and that a position of neutrality and of compromise runs counter to the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism and makes the struggle against imperialism more difficult."

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BUDAPEST PAPER EVINCES CONCERN OVER SINO-U.S. "RAPPROCHEMENT"

In keeping with Budapest's role as leading proxy spokesman for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet polemic, an article in the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG by Varnai on 7 November represents the bluntest attack on President Nixon's projected visit to Peking yet to appear in Soviet bloc media and notably registers concern over "the possibilities of an American-Chinese rapprochement."

Pointing to the past history of Sino-U.S. relations, Varnai comments that "it is no exaggeration to say that the U.S. President will be forced to undertake a humiliating pilgrimage to Canossa in visiting the Chinese capital." He adds that "Nixon's visit to Peking is tantamount to a fiasco for U.S. policy based on the nonrecognition of People's China and aimed at isolating this vast country." Analyzing the President's motives for visiting Peking, Varnai says "the U.S. imperialists" would like to extricate themselves from the Vietnam dilemma in Peking "under conditions satisfying for the U.S. capitalists, with the Chinese leaders' aid." He defines as an additional motivation of "U.S. strategists" the objective of shifting the balance of power against the Soviets by entertaining the possibility "that despite the existing disparity of interests, Peking's nationalist and world-power aspirations coincide with U.S. notions."

After noting that the Chinese leaders "are willing to receive the U.S. President," Varnai goes on to claim that "they have rejected high-level talks with the Soviet leaders"--an allegation Moscow itself has not made. He adds that the Sino-Soviet border talks "have been marking time for two years because various Soviet proposals aimed at a settlement remain unanswered." Moscow has been leaving it to its East European proxy spokesmen to bring up the matter of the talks.

Seeking to fan suspicions in the international movement over Sino-American "collusion," Varnai says that "a flirtation between Peking and Washington would rightly elicit the misgivings and disapproval of the Indochinese, the DPRK, and many other Asian countries--countries in direct conflict with U.S. imperialism, whose vital interests are attached to the unity of the anti-imperialist forces."

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Linking the Peking visit to the President's projected visit to Moscow, Varnai concludes with the pointed reminder that "what the President takes with him first to Peking and then to Moscow will determine in many respects the impression and answers he will take home with him from both capitals, and particularly from Moscow, which is doubtless more important for the United States in the final analysis."

PEKING EXPRESSES HOPE FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS

Peking has used the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary to indicate that Sino-Soviet relations are not excluded from its moves to normalize the PRC's relationships within the international community. In a message a shade more conciliatory than last year's, the Chinese said they are "deeply convinced" that "the friendly and good-neighborly relations" between the two countries "will eventually be restored and developed." Last year's message posited the same goal but without the expression of confident hope. An offensive reference to Stalin's tutelage appearing in the 1970 message, and deleted in PRAVDA's version of the message, was not present this year.

As in 1970, the Chinese message--again addressed from the NPC Standing Committee and the State Council to their Soviet counterparts--urged that "important questions" involving state relations between the two countries be settled on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Also like last year, the message affirmed that "controversies of principle" should not affect the two countries' state relations.

Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov's reception marking the anniversary was again attended by PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chaio Kuan-hua, chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks and newly appointed head of the PRC delegation to the current UNGA session. Also attending were the Chinese ambassador to the USSR, Liu Hsin-chuan, and the chief Soviet negotiator at the border talks, L. F. Ilichev, and his deputy. The expanded Chinese turnout included the naval commander.

As if to underscore the triangular setting of Peking's diplomatic moves, NCNA's report on the 9 November departure of Chiao Kuan-hua for the United Nations noted the presence of Ilichev. A powerful group of Chinese leaders present at the airport was headed by Chou En-lai.

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While calling for improved state relations with the Soviets, Peking has also reminded the communist movement of the "controversies of principle" mentioned in the message. On the same day as the October Revolution anniversary, the CCP sent a message to the Albanian party on its anniversary reaffirming a common interest in opposing "Soviet revisionism." In a special gesture to the Albanians, on 8 November the Chinese took the opportunity of a rally celebrating the Albanian anniversary to put on view the top leaders currently making appearances: Chou, Chiang Ching, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Li Hsien-nien. In his speech at the rally Chang praised the Albanians for waging an uncompromising struggle against "modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist leading clique as its center." The same point was made in an 8 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversary.

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INDOCHINA

The U.S. air strikes on 7 and 8 November against North Vietnam--described by U.S. spokesmen as the heaviest since those of 21 September--prompted only a routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, which does, however, assail them "as particularly serious." Followup comment on the 9th claims that bombing throughout Indochina had been intensified on the eve of Defense Secretary Laird's trip to Saigon.

Authoritative criticism was leveled at the Administration and the Nixon Doctrine in a 2 November NHAN DAN article by Nguyen Huu Chinh--a frequent commentator on U.S. affairs--pegged to the Senate rejection of the foreign aid bill. Chinh revived a line used during the July-August anti-China polemic when he claimed that the Nixon Doctrine is aimed "at sowing dissension in the socialist camp." At the same time, Hanoi, which has never mentioned the President's planned trips to Peking and Moscow, continues to demonstrate its even-handed treatment of its two big allies. Thus, propaganda on the October Revolution Anniversary, in a departure from the practice of previous years, refers to Chinese as well as Soviet aid to the DRV. On the 1 October Chinese National Day Hanoi had also atypically referred to Soviet as well as Chinese aid.

Soviet restraint toward the United States, particularly in the wake of the announcement of the President's plan to visit Moscow, seemed reflected in Soviet Politburo member Grishin's remarks on Vietnam in his keynote address on the October Revolution anniversary. Criticizing American "aggression" in cryptic and general terms, Grishin said nothing about the Vietnamization policy, although he did assail continued U.S. air strikes against the DRV.

Communist media marked the 18th anniversary of Cambodian independence much as they did last year, with publicity for a reception in Peking at which Chou En-lai and Sihanouk spoke. But unlike last year, neither the Chinese leaders' message nor the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial repeated the call to "persevere in a protracted people's war" in Indochina. Such calls dropped out of the propaganda after Peking, in the wake of Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos, exuded confidence over the military situation.

MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES 7, 8 NOVEMBER U.S. STRIKES IN DRV

The U.S. air strikes in the North Vietnam provinces of Quang Binh and Nghe An on 7 and 8 November--described by U.S. spokesmen as

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the deepest this year and the heaviest since 21 September--are protested in a routine statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 8th. However, it differs from the recent spokesman's statements when it recalls the "savage bombings" on 21 September and refers to "repeated" raids in Vinh Linh and Quang Binh Province as well as to strikes in Lai Chau and Ha Tinh provinces.

The 21 September raids were denounced at the higher level of a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 22d and they prompted the communist delegates at the Paris talks to boycott the session on the 23d.* The alleged strikes in Ha Tinh and Lai Chau were protested in ministry spokesman's statements on 16 October and 3 November, respectively. (Other routine spokesman's statements since 21 September were issued on 27 September and 5, 9, and 22 October.)

The latest protest calls the strikes on 7 and 8 November "particularly serious," saying they were against "populated areas" around Dong Hoi, capital of Quang Binh, and "a number of localities" in Nghe An Province, and "caused damage in lives and property to the local population." Casualties were also mentioned in the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement and the spokesman's protest on 3 November. The spokesman now says that these "grave acts of war proved that the obdurate and war-seeking U.S. imperialists still are hatching their schemes of military adventure against the DRV." And in standard fashion the protest says the United States "must bear full responsibility for the consequences of its acts of war against the DRV."

The protest also notes the alleged downing of two U.S. planes in Nghe An on the 8th, which had been reported earlier that day by Hanoi radio. The earlier broadcasts said that several other U.S. planes were damaged, and called the downings a "stern warning" by the DRV armed forces and people who would punish all U.S. "reckless acts of war" against the DRV. These latest claims bring Hanoi's total downed planes to 3,401.**

* For a discussion of propaganda following those strikes see the TRENDS of 22 September, pages 4-6, and 29 September, pages 6-7.

** At the time of the bombings on 21 September, DRV propaganda similarly claimed two planes, bringing the total at that time to 3,399. That total was incorrectly put at 3,999 on page four of the 22 September TRENDS.

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The DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 9th and the party organ NHAN DAN on the 10th echo the foreign ministry spokesman's claim that the latest air strikes caused "losses in lives and property." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN calls the strikes "acts that encroached in a very brazen and gross manner" on DRV sovereignty and security and says the Nixon Administration had repeatedly committed "many war crimes" against the North Vietnamese. Both papers round up alleged U.S. action against the North during October; they claim, among other things, that strikes were carried out on 72 occasions while "B-52's" on 33 occasions dropped more than 4,000 tons of bombs on Quang Binh and Vinh Linh." They also called attention to the alleged attacks on 30 October in Dien Bien district, Lai Chau Province.

NHAN DAN says these U.S. "serious acts of war" prove that the United States is "planning new military adventures" against the DRV, and it cites a Cornell University study as saying that "during Nixon's Administration more bombs have been dropped in Vietnam than during Johnson's." NHAN DAN, like a Hanoi radio comment on the 9th, says that the "new crimes . . . are closely connected" with Secretary Laird's recent visit to Saigon. And both items score Laird's "arrogant threat that the United States will continue the bombing as long as it deems necessary."

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claims to see signs of new U.S. "military adventures" in the presence of the aircraft carrier Constellation in Indochinese waters as well as the intensification of the bombing throughout Indochina during Laird's visit. The paper routinely asserts that no activity will save the U.S. position, that the United States was "properly punished" by the downing of the two planes and that the northern armed forces and people, "constantly vigilant and combat ready, are determined to appropriately punish all U.S. acts of war." Similarly, NHAN DAN calls the downings "a serious warning" and an "encouragement to us to resolutely smash all military adventures" of the United States. It says that the armed forces, especially those in the military area just north of the demilitarized zone, "will always heighten their vigilance and step up their technical and tactical training and combat readiness along with other air defense activities so that they may win resounding victories under all circumstances."

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 9th condemns the strikes and says that for each "aggression" against the North, the South Vietnamese "will punish them five or 10 times harder." It adds that this warning "has been carried out for many years."

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LAIRD TRIP SEEN AS PREPARATION FOR "NEW MILITARY ADVENTURES"

Vietnamese communist propaganda on Defense Secretary Laird's 3-6 November visit in Saigon claims that the purpose of his stay was to prepare for "new military adventures" to expand and intensify the war. Laird is also said to have been concerned to paint a "rosy picture" of Vietnamization in preparation for the President's imminent speech on further U.S. troop withdrawals, and to assure President Thieu that U.S. aid will not be cut off. In addition to Hanoi and Front radio comment on the Secretary's visit, according to VNA press reviews there was comment in the Hanoi papers on 6 and 8 November. Hanoi radio on the 10th broadcast a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, but it is not yet available in translation.

Castigating Secretary Laird's trip--and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer's visits to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok--propaganda observes that Laird's previous fact-finding trips to Saigon in early 1970 and 1971 were followed by "new U.S. acts to step up and expand the war"--the Cambodian incursion in 1970 and the Laos campaign early this year. Evidence that allied military activities intensified prior to Laird's arrival in Saigon was detailed in a 29 October Liberation Radio commentary which scored U.S. naval reinforcements, ARVN operations with U.S. support, plans to strengthen the Cambodian army five-fold, increased aid to Laos, and attacks on the DRV. The commentary went on typically to charge that the Secretary's visit was aimed at "concocting adventurous and reckless schemes to intensify the war and commit more crimes."

TROOP WITHDRAWAL Linking Laird's trip to the President's upcoming announcement on further U.S. troop withdrawals, a 9 November LPA commentary typically said that "as everyone knows, Laird's trip . . . was aimed at creating an optimistic picture to be used by Nixon in a forthcoming speech." Declaring that Laird "pretended to be deaf and blind to the actual situation," the commentary, also carried by Hanoi radio, said that the "colorful picture" the Secretary will return with, "as well as Nixon's deceitful tricks in his coming speech, by no means help demonstrate 'good will for peace,' 'successful Vietnamization,' or the 'end of the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam.'"

Comment scored Laird's statement at his press conference on the 6th about the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Vietnam

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for the protection of American forces stationed there. A Liberation Radio broadcast on the 7th, for example, asserted that this statement "clearly shows to everyone that Nixon's boast that all U.S. combat troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam is only designed to fool public opinion."

NHAN DAN CALLS REJECTION OF AID BILL BLOW TO NIXON DOCTRINE

The 29 October Senate vote against the Administration's foreign aid authorization bill was used as a peg for a general attack on Nixon's policy in the 2 November NHAN DAN. The article written by Nguyen Huu Chinh--an author who frequently comments on U.S. affairs*--was reviewed by VNA on the 2d and broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 3d. Chinh said that while the President has described the vote as resulting from a temporary alliance of dovish senators who oppose the Vietnam war and conservatives who resented the anti-U.S. vote in the United Nations on the China issue, in fact the vote "has brought into bold relief the thoughts, doubts, and worries which are torturing millions of Americans in the face of the Nixon Administration's foreign and domestic policies." The author added that the senators are using their rights with respect to the budget as a tool to oppose a foreign policy "which is not in accordance with the actual and lasting interests of the United States. In reality, the question of whether or not the foreign aid program should be continued has become a sharp conflict."

The NHAN DAN commentator declared that the "lackeys" whose survival depends on U.S. aid become a "support for U.S. imperialism to carry out its expansionist policy and that the foreign aid program has become more important since the appearance of the Nixon Doctrine." He went on to comment that

* Most recently, Nguyen Huu Chinh discussed the President's 15 August, 9 September, and 7 October remarks on his new economic policies in NHAN DAN articles on 13 September and 13 October. In a 4 June NHAN DAN article, pegged to the President's 1 June press conference, Chinh also discussed the U.S. economy and claimed that "the American people's crisis of confidence has become a major threat to Nixon's political life." Chinh also had articles on the congressional elections in 1970 as well as the Presidential campaign in 1968.

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the Administration has not tried to cover up the purpose of the Nixon Doctrine, which he said is aimed among other things "at sowing dissension in the socialist camp." (During the height of the July-August anti-Chinese polemic, the Nixon Doctrine was repeatedly described as aimed at splitting the socialist countries, but this claim has appeared only infrequently since then.)

Chinh called the Senate vote "a quite devastating blow" to the Nixon Doctrine. And he said that while it is evident that not all senators shared Fulbright's opinion that the Administration is using it "as a main weapon in the cold war," it is "obvious" that U.S. flexibility is now limited. The author observed that the defeated bill dealt only with a small part of the total U.S. foreign aid: A large number of programs are camouflaged under different names and are beyond the control of Congress and large sums of military aid remain intact, "especially U.S. military aid funds for the U.S. puppet administrations in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane." He said that the Administration will use every means to restore the rejected expenditures, but concluded that the vote on 29 October "reminds Nixon that he is facing strong opposition from Congress."

OCTOBER REVOLUTION KEYNOTE SPEECH REAFFIRMS SOVIET SUPPORT

Soviet determination to continue assistance to the Vietnamese was routinely reiterated in propaganda on the October Revolution anniversary. Politburo member Grishin declared in his keynote address that the Soviet Union has given Vietnam economic and military aid and will continue to do so. The new aid agreements signed with the DRV during Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi last month, he said, were "a clear testimony to the consistent implementation of the great principles of socialist internationalism by our party and the Soviet people." And in reviewing Soviet leaders' recent foreign travels as an implementation of the USSR's "peace program," he called Podgornyy's DRV visit a "new striking confirmation of our unbreakable friendship and fraternal cooperation with that heroic country."

Grishin delivered a mild, pro forma attack on U.S. Indochina policy. Observing that the Soviet Union supports the "heroic" people of Vietnam and other Indochina countries in their struggle against the "American aggressors" and backs the PRG's seven-point peace proposal, he said "facts show that the American ruling circles" do not want to seek a political solution: "The United States is torpedoing the Paris talks and is not stopping the barbaric bombing raids over the DRV."

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Grishin avoided the usual attack on the U.S. Vietnamization policy, where in last year's October Revolution anniversary speech Suslov had scored the Vietnamization policy and American "aggression" in Laos and Cambodia. Grishin's language also contrasts with Suslov's specific attack on the U.S. "Government" for "resorting to all sorts of devices" in trying to Vietnamize the conflict or Americanize the settlement. As might have been expected during his Hanoi visit, Podgornyy in several speeches denounced U.S. operations in South Vietnam, the bombings of the DRV, and aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well as the "Guam doctrine" and the pacification policy, and asserted that the peoples of Indochina will make Vietnamization a failure.

CAMBODIAN NATIONAL DAY: CHOU, SIHANOUK SPEAK IN PEKING

PEKING CELEBRATIONS As in 1970, Peking marked the anniversary of Cambodian independence (9 November) with a message from Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, and speeches by Chou and Sihanouk. The latter two spoke at a Peking rally last year; this time they spoke at a reception hosted by Sihanouk. A Peking "report meeting" attended by Li Hsien-nien was held this year, with Ieng Sary, "special envoy" of the "interior part" of the RGNU, reporting on the military and political successes of Sihanouk's front and government.

Consistent with Peking's current political and diplomatic posture, Chinese statements on the Cambodian anniversary omit former formulations prescribing protracted war in Indochina and denouncing U.S. "counterrevolutionary dual tactics." Thus the PRC leaders' message to the Cambodians, as well as similar messages on DRV National Day (2 September) and Laotian Independence Day (12 October), omitted the call for perseverance in protracted people's war that figured in all three messages last year. The formula on protracted war disappeared from Chinese comment in the wake of the Lam Son 719 operation in southern Laos and the emergence of a notably confident portrayal of the Indochinese situation as "unprecedentedly fine."

Similarly, Peking in recent months has been accenting the positive regarding an Indochinese peace settlement, with endorsements of the peace proposals of its allies and clients replacing its former attacks on U.S. proposals. Where Chou last year took the occasion of the Cambodian anniversary to deprecate President Nixon's

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proposals, this year he expressed support for Sihanouk's five-point declaration, the PRG's seven-point peace proposal, and the five-point program of the NLHS.

Chou avoided any direct attack on the Nixon Administration, but he took the opportunity to voice Peking's line on a growing unity among "medium and small countries" in opposition to the superpowers. Observing that the world is in the midst of "a violent upheaval" and taking note of the UN vote for seating the PRC, Chou intoned that "the superpowers are finding it more and more difficult to practice power politics and hegemony and engage in their truculent acts of bullying and butchering weak and small nations as will."

In his reception speech Sihanouk typically expressed concern over a possible accommodation on Cambodia, rebuking "foreign governments and circles" for recommending a "so-called 'political' solution." He once again rejected the idea of "a 'new Geneva conference' or a political solution," claiming that President Nixon alone holds the key to a settlement and must stop his interference in Cambodian internal affairs. Unlike last year, Chou did not echo Sihanouk's denunciation of a conference. Last year Chou accused the United States and its "collaborator" of "scheming to carve up Cambodia."

Ieng Sary's report to the Peking meeting contained an allusion to President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC in the course of an attack on alleged U.S. schemes for new aggression. He warned that "though U.S. imperialism is compelled to come to China with a white flag," it continues its "vicious intrigues" of denying the rights of weak and small countries and is resorting to "new trickery" to deceive world public opinion. This rather surprising passage, which might be read as an expression of concern--shared by the Vietnamese communists*--over the effect of the Nixon visit, was included in NCNA's account of the speech. This represents the first public reference to the President's visit--albeit without mentioning the President directly--to have been made in Peking. Sihanouk's remarks on the visit last summer were in a message released while he was in North Korea. Apart from reports on the Kissinger missions, the only references to the President's visit which have appeared in PRC media have been attributed to foreign sources.

* Peking and Hanoi media have reported that Ieng Sary arrived in Hanoi on 10 November at the head of a FUNK/RGNU delegation for a "friendship visit."

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MOSCOW Attention to the Cambodian anniversary in Soviet media was confined last year to routine-level radio commentaries broadcast in Cambodian and in Mandarin to South Asia. This year Moscow publicized a "day of solidarity," and TASS reported that a meeting of the "Moscow public" was held on the 9th but failed to mention the sponsors or name any speakers.

TASS said that the Moscow meeting approved a telegram to the FUNK Central Committee condemning the aggression of "the U.S. imperialists and their flunkies" and pledging that the Soviet people will always "be on the side of peoples fighting for their freedom and independence, for peace, democracy, and social progress." A TASS commentary on the 8th also mentioned the FUNK, saying that it is leading and directing "this truly people's war." The commentary also said the FUNK has united "the patriots of the country" and praised its political program for a "fair and peaceful settlement" of the Cambodian problem. Moscow's anniversary propaganda last year did not mention the FUNK, merely noting that the "Cambodian People's Liberation Armed Forces" were fighting imperialism. Soviet media, of course, mention neither Sihanouk nor his government.

In his speech in Peking Sihanouk made one of his recurrent pointed allusions to Soviet refusal to recognize the RGNLU, noting that 28 countries have recognized his government and calling on "other countries and governments who are sincerely friendly to our people and sincerely love justice, democracy, freedom, and peace to kindly give their official recognition to the RGNLU."

VIETNAMESE Greetings messages were sent to Sihanouk and Penn COMMUNISTS Nouth by DRV President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong and by PRG leaders Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat. This year as last, a NHAN DAN article praised the Cambodian people's accomplishments in the struggle against the "U.S. imperialist aggressors" and their "lackeys" and pledged continued Vietnamese support in accordance with Ho Chi Minh's testament and the joint statement of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference.

Hanoi again marked the anniversary with a "solidarity week," but there was apparently no Hanoi meeting. Last year a meeting was sponsored by the DRV Fatherland Front and Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. A statement by an official of the two organizations was broadcast this year, praising the victories of the Cambodian people and pledging Vietnamese solidarity. The NFLSV Central Committee and the South Vietnamese Committee for the Defense of World Peace held a meeting similar to one held last year.

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CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS SAID TO SUFFER HEAVY LOSSES

Communist comment on the war in Indochina focuses on the fighting along Cambodian Highway 6, where communist forces are credited with inflicting heavy casualties on Phnom Penh troops taking part in the Chenla II operation. An 8 November report by Sihanouk's news agency, AKI, on the most recent fighting claims that in the 10 days from 26 October to 4 November the Cambodian National People's Liberation Armed Forces (CNPLAF) on Highway 6 killed or wounded 3,100 troops and captured 210. The report says 7,800 government troops have been killed since the launching of Chenla II on 21 August.

The CNPLAF's "frustration" of the Chenla II operation was hailed in the Hanoi press on 5 November. An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 5th noted that the announced purpose of Chenla II was to ease communist pressure on Kompong Thom city,* but it went on to claim that the operation was in fact aimed "at cutting off the transportation route of the CNPLAF and at attacking and occupying the liberated areas."

NHAN DAN's editorial underscored the massive nature of the operation--involving, it said, 70 battalions and about 20,000 men, supported by U.S. aircraft. Citing Western news reports to document its failure, the editorial said AFP reported that U.S. commanders were "panic-stricken" in the face of government defeats and not only continued their air support but also sent officers to the area to study the situation. Other communist comment, including the LPA commentary on the 5th, has charged directly that U.S. officers are in command of the operation.

PARIS: COMMUNISTS IGNORE U.S. REMARKS ON DWINDLING POW MAIL

Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged Ambassador Porter's remarks in a preliminary statement at the 4 November session of the Paris talks on the sharp decrease in the volume of mail received from American prisoners of war held by the DRV.

* Phnom Penh's announcement in mid-October that Highway 6 had been opened to Kompong Thom was ridiculed in a 16 October AKI commentary which maintained that, on the contrary, the road "has been cut in several places and the CNPLAF have relentlessly trounced the enemy there."

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The VNA account of the session said only that the U.S. representative "rehashed the so-called prisoner-of-war problem with a more provocative and arrogant tone." Consistent with its general practice,* Hanoi media did not report the remarks by DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le at his post-session briefing in which he called Ambassador Porter's reference to decreased mail a "fabrication" and insisted that DRV policy toward U.S. prisoners is "humane and unswerving."

Procedures for mailing Christmas packages to the prisoners this year have not yet been announced by Hanoi. The announcements had come progressively earlier for the past three years--on 9 November in 1970, 18 November in 1969, and 13 December in 1968.

GVN RELEASE OF VC POW'S The VNA account of the Paris session on 28 October also ignored GVN deputy delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong's announcement that 2,938 communist prisoners would be released to mark President Thieu's 31 October inauguration. The VNA account in fact ignored the GVN statement completely, as it has been doing for the past several sessions.

The GVN's release of prisoners was denigrated in Front propaganda, however, including an LPA commentary on the 30th and a Liberation Radio commentary on the 31st. LPA said that in order "to beautify the 'national day' farce and the celebration of Thieu's reelection," the Saigon administration is "making a ballyhoo about it's release of 3,000 people illegally detained whom they call 'communist prisoners.'" The LPA commentary added that the release "cannot whitewash Thieu's crimes" against the people, and the Liberation Radio broadcast said that Thieu directed his "psychological warfare agencies" to publicize this "cheap swindle as a manifestation of his good will."

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PRC - PAKISTAN

BHUTTO VISIT NETS PAKISTAN LIMITED PEKING COMMITMENT

Ali Bhutto's apparently hastily arranged 5-8 November "friendly visit" to Peking "at the invitation of the Chinese Government" yielded a limited and carefully measured commitment of Chinese support for Pakistan in its confrontation with India over the East Bengal problem. The trip by Bhutto, leader of the West Pakistan-based People's Party, was likely intended as a counterweight to the recent show of Soviet support for India and to Indira Gandhi's "information trip" to a number of Western capitals, including Washington. But while gaining a reaffirmation of Chinese support after a period of silence, the Pakistanis did not receive pledges going beyond Peking's previous stand. During the visit the Chinese refrained from abusive anti-Indian comment beyond pro forma charges of interference in internal Pakistani affairs, glossed over the contentious issues in East Pakistan, and pledged their support in vague terms contingent on "foreign aggression" against Pakistan. Most notably, the Chinese called for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Pakistani conflict.

Since the onset of the crisis last March Peking has taken a notably low posture on the tense Indian-Pakistani situation stemming from the civil war in East Bengal and the resulting flow of refugees into India. Peking has not discussed the details of the crisis in East Bengal; it did not publicly acknowledge messages of support to Pakistani President Yahya Khan reported by Pakistani and Indian sources to have been sent by Mao and Chou En-lai in mid-April; it has not mentioned the flow of refugees to India; and it has not reported the Soviet-Indian treaty. Moreover, while Chinese media earlier had periodically reported Pakistani protests to India charging hostile military activities, they have not done so since 20 August.

Peking has been careful to avoid taking an inflammatory line during a period in which it has continued to make gestures toward India as part of its broadening diplomatic moves. Recently, for example, an Indian table tennis team arrived in the PRC to take part in an Afro-Asian tournament, and NCNA carried Indira Gandhi's message of congratulations on the UN vote for seating the PRC.

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The Pakistan delegation, which was heavily military in composition, held talks with Chou and Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei in what NCNA termed "a friendly atmosphere." According to an NCNA account of a banquet given by Bhutto on the 7th, Chou said in a toast that the talks "on questions of common interest have achieved satisfactory results"; and Bhutto was quoted as expressing "satisfaction with the current visit," adding that "we had extremely fruitful discussions and are returning to Pakistan with complete satisfaction." However, no communique was issued, no military or economic agreement was announced, and there was no across-the-board Chinese endorsement of the Pakistani position. Peking carried no editorial comment on the visit.

INDIAN ROLE Peking's carefully measured commitment to Pakistan was reflected in the relatively temperate remarks by Chi Peng-fei. According to NCNA's account of a banquet he hosted on the 7th for the Pakistani delegation, Chi dwelt only briefly on India, observing that the Indian Government "has crudely interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs" and has "carried out subversive activities and military threats against Pakistan by continuing to exploit the East Pakistan question."

This contrasted with Bhutto's anti-Indian tirade when, in his speech, he condemned the Indian Government's "activities to disintegrate and subvert Pakistan"--specifying that it was persisting in "training, arming, and launching infiltrators and saboteurs" against Pakistan--and charged that India "has encouraged, incited, and financed a secessionist movement to strike at the roots of our country." Describing "feverish" Indian military activities, such as the deployment of its armed forces "including heavy armor and artillery and aircraft" along both borders with Pakistan in an effort "to intimidate us," Bhutto concluded that "India is planning to achieve its objective against Pakistan through armed conflict."

EAST PAKISTAN QUESTION Chi maintained that "the East Pakistan question" is the "internal affair" of Pakistan and called for a "reasonable settlement" by "the Pakistani people themselves." In a platitudinous tone, he asserted that "the broad masses of the Pakistani people are patriotic and they want to safeguard national unity and unification of the country, and they oppose internal split and outside interference."

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During the course of developing tensions Peking has largely avoided addressing the East Pakistan problem as such, referring only occasionally to "secessionist elements" while focusing on alleged Indian and great-power interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. Regarding the latter, Chi declared that "it is absolutely impermissible for any foreign country to carry out interference and subversion under any pretext," adding--in an apparent allusion to the Soviets--that "certain persons are truculently exerting pressure on Pakistan by exploiting tension in the subcontinent in a wild attempt to realize their ulterior motives." Similarly, Bhutto expressed regret that "some countries" have "succumbed to Indian propaganda and pressure" and noted that India "openly asserts that she has acquired massive arms and boasts that she would not be alone in conflict against Pakistan." Neither speaker specifically mentioned the Soviet Union and neither referred to the Soviet-Indian treaty.

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

While maintaining that the East Pakistani matter, Chi expressed Peking's concern over the possibility of major hostilities erupting. The Chinese government and people "are greatly concerned over the present tension in the subcontinent," according to Chi, who said the Chinese position is that "disputes between states should be settled by the two sides concerned through consultations and not by resorting to force." The reference to "consultations"--rather than to negotiations--suggests Chinese care to avoid overstepping the line that it is up to the Pakistanis themselves to settle the basic question. Offering further support to Pakistan, Chi urged compliance with "the reasonable proposal" by President Yahya Khan for mutual Indian-Pakistani troop withdrawal from the border as a means of "easing tension in the subcontinent."

Regarding possible hostilities, the Chinese were careful in pledging continued support for Pakistan. Chi assured his guests that "should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistani Government and people in their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence." This reflected no movement on Peking's side from the position stated in the 11 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article that the Chinese Government and people "will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle for safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty and against foreign aggression and interference."

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The absence of stronger Chinese pledges of support seemed reflected in Bhutto's remarks that Pakistan was prepared to defend itself. Declaring that if Pakistan is attacked "we shall not be found wanting in defending our honor and our homes," Bhutto simply expressed "appreciation and gratitude for the understanding and support which the government and people of China have shown" and noted that Chinese "friendship and support will continue to be a source of inspiration and strength to all of us." Bhutto did not echo his host's appeal for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

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USSR-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLS FOR STEPPED-UP ATTACK ON "RIGHTISTS"

Addressing a rally held in Prague on 4 November to mark the October Revolution anniversary, Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko seemed to go out of his way to suggest that the Czechoslovak communists were not moving with sufficient vigor to quell persisting "rightist" opposition. In his speech on the same occasion a year ago, Chervonenko had been more sanguine on the CPCZ's prospects for successfully overcoming the influence of the ousted liberal forces.

The ascendant position of the conservatives in the CSSR is underscored by the fact that the October Revolution keynote address has been delivered for two successive years by a major conservative figure in the party leadership--Vasil Bilak in 1970 and Alois Indra this time. Indra, elevated to full membership in the Politburo in February, heads the Central Election Commission which is in charge of the long-delayed elections to the country's governmental bodies, to be held this month. Faced with public apathy and hostility, the regime has emphasized in its propaganda a need to combat the still not fully vanquished right wing. The propaganda has for the most part been couched in general terms, with the inimical forces unspecified, although the party organ RUDE PRAVO reacted directly on 25 September to the publication of an antiregime interview by the liberal Josef Smrkovsky--still living in Czechoslovakia--in the Milan weekly GIORNI-VIE NUOVE on the 16th.

At the 4 November rally, broadcast live in the Prague domestic service, Chervonenko registered a pro forma observation that the Czechoslovak communists "have withstood the tests" and "foiled the counterrevolutionary plots," then proceeded to discourse at length on the urgency of a more intensive ideological struggle. He reminded his hosts of the stand taken by the 14th CPCZ Congress in May to the effect that "there remain not a few problems and difficulties which must be overcome in order to completely eliminate the consequences of the activity of rightwing revisionists and antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia in various spheres of party, state, and economic construction, as well as in the sphere of ideology." In his speech a year ago, the ambassador had merely expressed "understanding" of the difficulties facing the Czechoslovaks in the antirightist struggle and a "conviction" that they would succeed.

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Chervonenko went on to lecture this time that the "lessons" drawn by the Czechoslovak communists "make it imperative to understand that Lenin's warning--that the struggle against opportunism requires utmost revolutionary firmness and that no compromise is admissible--has enormous fundamental significance today even more than ever before." Pressing the point, he recalled Lenin's warning to a Czechoslovak communist, Smeral, that "nobody should be forgiven anything," that "I . . . cannot forgive your moderation, consideration for your political opponents. Change your attitude, fight, and reject--ruthlessly reject--any policy of compromise," which "undermines the workers' movement and leads it toward social democracy."

Underscoring the CSSR's reintegration into the Soviet bloc, Chervonenko noted "the consistent consolidation and constantly growing friendship between Czechoslovakia and its socialist allies, Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact--all this is a worthy response to the enemies of socialism." Protection of the CSSR against its "opponents," he added, is also provided by the Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship treaty of May 1970. He recalled, in this connection, that "at a time of trials and a crisis-ridden development of Czechoslovakia, the activists of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship were in the front ranks of the struggle against rightist revisionism, anti-Soviet elements, and the counterrevolution."

Neither Chervonenko nor Indra explicitly recalled the "fraternal assistance" provided Czechoslovakia in August 1968; both Chervonenko and Bilak had used the term at last year's October Revolution meeting in Prague.* Chervonenko this year cited the "truly acute political crisis in 1968 and 1969," and Indra employed a generalized formulation to the effect that revisionist reformers of 1968 had "failed precisely because the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries and the loyal Czechoslovak communists and other patriots are guided by the behest of the Great October and with honor and in practice implement the principles of Leninist teachings." In the same vein, Indra added that "the more time separates us from August

* The October Revolution anniversary message from the Czechoslovak leaders to their Soviet counterparts this year, as last year, recalls the Czechoslovak "crisis" but does not directly mention the August 1968 intervention.

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1968, the more clearly its importance emerges, the more visible is its positive influence on the development of mankind." And in lavish remarks on the theme of solidarity with the USSR, he said that "the Soviet people . . . never betrayed or deserted their class brothers in moments of severe tests, whether it was in Hungary in 1956 or three years ago here in Czechoslovakia." He thanked "Comrade Brezhnev personally for the enormous work carried out in the interest of all mankind" in the current Soviet peace offensive.

Indra and Chervonenko both registered correct tributes to the stewardship of Gustav Husak as CPCZ First Secretary since April 1969, and both pointedly quoted the CPCZ leader on the score of relations with the USSR. Indra said "we agreed from the bottom of our hearts with Comrade Husak, who stated on returning from the 24th CPSU Congress: 'Whoever does not have good relations with the Soviet Union does not have good relations with our socialist system or with his own people.'" The Soviet ambassador prefaced his call for a stepped-up CPCZ ideological struggle with the remark that "rightwing opportunism and revisionism, as our recent experience has convincingly confirmed, said Comrade Gustav Husak at the 14th CPCZ Congress, inevitably culminates in overt betrayal of socialism and the revolutionary workers movement and in overt adoption of anticomunist, anti-Soviet positions."

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

AMCHITKA NUCLEAR TEST

TASS predictably highlighted continuing worldwide protests, notably from Japan and Canada, in reporting the 6 November detonation of a U.S. nuclear device on Amchitka Island in the Aleutians. In its first report on the detonation, noting U.S. Government efforts to "play down" the dangers, TASS cited the New York TIMES to point to "the great risk not only for the environment but also for world peace"; on the 9th it pointed to "confirmation" of U.S. scientists' apprehensions about damage to the environment. Soviet reportage in the preceding weeks had been featuring Japanese and Canadian protests as well as efforts in Congress and the U.S. scientific community to get the test called off. But Soviet comment anticipating the test was negligible and routine. The official Soviet attitude was publicized in a TASS report of UN delegate Malik's remarks in the UNGA's First Committee on 28 October reiterating the call for an underground nuclear test ban and stating that the Soviet Government "fully shared the concern and alarm" of the Canadian Government.

There has been no Moscow comment on the subject since 6 November. By contrast, the last U.S. nuclear test in the Aleutians, on 2 October 1969, occasioned an IZVESTIYA article the same day charging that the test was linked to the development of warheads for ABM's and MIRV's and was another step toward accelerating the arms race.

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